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The evidence of hearsay in criminal proceedings from 
Late Renaissance France
Tom Hamilton
Elites throughout Renaissance Europe wrote disdainfully about the dangers 
posed to society by the circulation of rumour, gossip, and hearsay. Lawyers 
were among the most disdainful of them all. In his discussion of customary law 
in France, the jurist Antoine Loisel cited a proverb to make his point that 
knowledge based on hearsay was worthless. ‘Ouy dire va par ville, et en un 
muid de cuider n’y a plein poing de sçavoir’.1 The lexicographer Randle 
Cotgrave translated the first part of the proverb as ‘Hearsay goeth speedily 
from doore to doore’.2 The second part might be rendered as ‘there is no 
wisdom in a cupful of thoughts’. Loisel’s coupling apparently brings together 
two strands of discourse. The first is a classical critique of rumour based on its 
prevalence and ephemerality. ‘Extemplo Libyae magnas it Fama per urbes 
[Straight away rumour went through the cities of Libya]’ (Virgil, Aeneid, IV, 
173).3 The second is a medieval vernacular disdain for popular knowledge 
that Loisel adapted by removing its social significance and stating it as a gen-
eral principle of customary law. ‘Mais li vilains dit en son proverbe: Qu’en un 
muid de cuidance / N’a plain pot de sapience [The plebs say in their proverb: 
A cupful of thoughts is no full pot of wisdom]’.4 In Loisel’s rendering, the 
1 Antoine Loisel, Institutes coutumières d’Antoine Loysel, ou manuel de plusieurs et diverses règles, sentences et prov-
erbs, tant anciens que modernes, du droit coutumier et plus ordinaire de la France, ed. Édouard Laboulaye, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Videcoq, 1846), ii, 152.
2 Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London: Adam Islip, 1611), ‘Ouï- dire’.
3 Annotations to Loisel’s collection of proverbs, composed primarily by the avocat in the Parlement of Paris 
Eusèbe de Laurière (1659– 1728) and reproduced in Lanoulaye’s 1846 edition, trace the first part of the prov-
erb to Angelus de Ubaldis, ‘Additiones’ (n.7) to Jacobus Aegidius, ‘De Testibus’ in Francesco Ziletti (ed.), 
Tractatus universi iuris, Vol. 4, De Probationibus (Venice: Francesco Ziletti, 1584), 75, a note that repeats a general 
point against hearsay evidence. On classical discussions of rumour and their reception, see Philip R. Hardie, 
Rumour and Renown: Representations of Fama in Western Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
4 The annotations in Lanoulaye’s edition trace this section of the proverb via Antoine Le Roux de Lincy 
(ed.), Le Livre des proverbes français, 2 vols (Paris: Paulin, 1842), ii, 356, to La Chronique de Rains: publiée sur le 
manuscrit unique de la Bibliothèque du roi, ed. Louis Paris: Tecjener (Paris, 1837), 68.
Research towards this article began as part of an ongoing collaboration with Mark Greengrass, the results 
of which will be published elsewhere. I would like to acknowledge his invaluable advice and encouragement 
during the research and writing of this article. For their comments and suggestions, I would also like to thank 
Rosanne Baars, John Gallagher, Adam Horsley, David van der Linden, Carla Roth, and the anonymous readers 
for the journal.
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proverb becomes a statement of customary law that instructs his readers – the 
judges, magistrates, and office- holders of late Renaissance France – to lament 
and ignore the regrettably frequent occurrences of rumour and hearsay in 
their society.
Despite Loisel’s derision, literary scholars and historians have recently 
shown how a well- established written tradition concerning rumour and its cri-
tique could be appropriated, challenged, or reinforced in canonical ancient, 
medieval, and Renaissance literary and historical works.5 More than just an 
empty cup, as in Loisel’s proverb, rumour in Renaissance culture might be 
better understood as a leaky vessel that is both void of sense and overflowing 
with meaning.6 Historians who have studied social relations and oral cultures 
across pre- modern Europe have further shown how the circulation of gossip, 
hearsay, and rumour had a crucial function that could strengthen the ties that 
bound together urban and rural communities in what remained a predomi-
nantly oral culture despite the arrival of the printing press.7 Historians of 
communication too have shown how diplomats, merchants, and officials in 
this period found it useful to circulate unverified reports despite the critique 
in Loisel’s proverbs, as part of establishing a mastery of circulating informa-
tion and establishing authority among their networks.8
The challenge remains, however, of establishing the ways in which people 
throughout the social hierarchy in Renaissance Europe evaluated the claims 
that circulated as rumours. Did most people share the disdain for hearsay that 
Loisel’s proverb suggested, or did some fall prey to rumour while others 
evaded its traps? Social and cultural historians of rumour have read legal 
records ‘against the grain’, alert to revelatory moments in the sources, as part 
of their studies of the role that gossip and rumour played in pre- modern com-
munities.9 However, the risk associated with this approach is that it might 
5 Mark Greengrass, ‘Rumeur et bien public dans les Ligues provinciales catholiques: l’exemple de Laon’ in 
La Sainte Union des catholiques de France et la fin des guerres de Religion (1585– 1629), ed. Serge Brunet and José Javier 
Ruiz Ibáñez, (Paris: Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2016), 133– 153; Emily Butterworth, The Unbridled Tongue: Babble 
and Gossip in Renaissance France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Keith M. Botelho, Renaissance 
Earwitnesses: Rumor and Early Modern Masculinity (Basingstoke, 2009); Henk Van Nierop, ‘“And Ye Shall Hear of 
Wars and Rumours of Wars”: Rumour and the Revolt of the Netherlands’, in Judith Pollmann and Andrew Spicer 
(eds.), Public Opinion and Changing Identities in the Early Modern Low Countries (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 69– 86.
6 Butterworth, The Unbridled Tongue, 197– 9.
7 Significant studies of these issues include: B. S. Capp, When Gossips Meet: Women, Family, and Neighbourhood 
in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 185– 266; Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture 
in England, 1500– 1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 335- 405; Penny Roberts, ‘Arson, Conspiracy 
and Rumour in Early Modern Europe’, Continuity and Change, 12 (1997), 9– 29.
8 See, for example, Rosanne M. Baars, Rumours of Revolt: Civil War and the Emergence of a Transnational News 
Culture in France and the Netherlands, 1561– 1598 (Leiden: Brill, 2021); Carla Roth, ‘Obscene Humour, Gender, 
and Sociability in Sixteenth- Century St Gallen’, Past & Present, 234 (2017), 39– 70; Elizabeth Horodwich, ‘The 
Gossiping Tongue: Oral Networks, Public Life and Political Culture in Early Modern Venice’, Renaissance 
Studies, 19 (2005), 22– 45.
9 A particularly compelling study that takes this approach is Elizabeth S. Cohen, ‘She Said, He Said: 
Situated Oralities in Judicial Records from Early Modern Rome’, Journal of Early Modern History, 16 (2012), 403– 
430, which raises procedural matters as qualifications to the argument about the role of ‘ordinary people’s talk 
in the transcripts’ on pp. 415– 17.
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serve to reinforce the assumptions of learned commentators who left a dis-
cerning engagement with rumour to literate elites. Histories of rumour writ-
ten ‘against the grain’ in this sense focus on second- hand reports of the word 
on the street rather than the direct evidence of the word on the page, and so 
they have not engaged with the legal theory that structured the proceedings 
of a trial. The approach of this article is instead to read legal records ‘along 
the archival grain’ in order to focus on the procedures and conceptual 
assumptions deployed by the people who produced these records. How did 
the magistrates, scribes, and deponents interact in the process of recording 
interrogations? What standards of evidence did they put to the test? And what 
kinds of legal knowledge do these records represent?10
The result of this approach is to reveal how people across pre- modern 
Europe, and Loisel’s society of late Renaissance France in particular, had a 
robust means of evaluating the epistemological status of rumour which was 
informed by the Roman law of proof as it concerned hearsay. The Roman law 
of proof distinguished valid witnesses – who had a direct, eyewitness view of 
events, and should not be biased either in favour of the accused or against 
them – from invalid witnesses who could not be trusted, although jurists per-
mitted magistrates a significant degree of discretion in discerning the status of 
the witnesses examined during the course of an investigation.11 Roman law 
primarily informed the practice of elite magistrates, yet non- elites who gave 
testimony as part of inquisitorial procedures also understood well its basic 
principles and might manipulate them to their own ends.12 This article 
demonstrates that deponents’ storytelling skills in court extended to a firm 
grasp of the value of hearsay evidence. The ways in which deponents manipu-
lated hearsay evidence, moreover, suggests that non- elites understood the 
dangers of the unbridled tongue, but also that they were willing to cite gossip 
if it suited them at a telling moment during an interrogation. Their law- 
minded approach to criminal proceedings suggests that such an understand-
ing of the epistemological status of hearsay spread far outside the courtroom 
too. In this sense, the gap between Loisel’s world of elite magistrates and the 
wider society on which they sat in judgement seems smaller than either 
Renaissance jurists or modern historians have allowed.
10 This approach builds on the conceptual terms of Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) and the methodological implications of Ann Laura Stoler, 
Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009).
11 For an overview of the legal principles, see Mirjan R. Damaška, Evaluation of Evidence: Pre- Modern and 
Modern Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), esp. 27– 117, and on some of the problems 
they raise see Penny Roberts, ‘“Acceptable Truths” during the French Religious Wars’, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 30 (2020), 55– 75; Andrea Frisch, The Invention of the Eyewitness: Witnessing and Testimony in Early 
Modern France (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).
12 The classic statement of this point is Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their 
Tellers in Sixteenth- Century France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).
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1. ‘ex audito alieno’
The best guide to the Roman law of proof in Renaissance France was the 
learned jurist and experienced magistrate Jean Milles de Souvigny, whose 
treatise Praxis criminis persequendi was first published in Paris in 1541, then re-
printed in Lyon and Venice in the 1540s and 1550s, was widely consulted 
across the European legal community of the ius commune. His text served to 
demonstrate how the principles of Roman law aligned with the correct way to 
proceed in French criminal justice, following the major consolidation of court 
practice represented by the ordonnance of Villers- Cotterêts in 1539. Hearsay 
encompassed several types of evidence for Souvigny. It included common ru-
mour or renown, reported direct speech, and reported indirect speech, all of 
which he described as hearsay, evidence overheard (ex auditu) and heard from 
a third party (ex audito alieno). Souvigny began his analysis of hearsay evidence 
by stating firmly that ‘the evidence of something that has been heard from 
someone else has no value as proof’, a point that appears in similar terms in 
the criminal code known as the Carolina of the Holy Roman Empire (1532) 
but not in any French royal ordonnance, since those texts were intended more 
as guides to institutional processes than substantive legal codifications.13 The 
image that accompanied Souvigny’s discussion of hearsay evidence demon-
strated his point, as it depicted in the top- right corner a witness who over-
heard what turned out to be a deadly fight at the public square below, but he 
did not have a clear view from behind his window and so Souvigny explained 
that the court could not count his evidence as valid proof (Fig. 1).14 Yet 
Souvigny went on to develop a more flexible position than these general 
points might suggest. In a gloss he had established that common- fame evi-
dence could be taken into account, so long as an earwitness named their 
source as an eyewitness who had been cross- examined. Much depended on 
whether the testimony made sense compared with other evidence or in the 
light of natural reason, Souvigny continued, for if it was inconclusive, irratio-
nal, or not pertaining to the case, then it could prove nothing at all. In the 
remainder of the gloss, Souvigny explained that what a witness believes they 
have heard or seen cannot be considered without supporting proof because 
they might be mistaken in their apprehension. All of these glosses depended 
on a dense network of references to Bartolist commentaries on the chapters 
‘On Witnesses [De Testibus]’ in Justinian’s Codex IV.20 and Digest 22.5.15 
13 Jean Milles de Souvigny, Praxis criminis persequendi (Paris: Simon de Colines, 1541), fol. 13; Fredrich- 
Chrisitian Schroeder (ed.), Die Peinliche Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V. (Carolina) und des Heiligen Römischen Reichs 
von 1532 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000), 54.
14 Souvigny, Praxis criminis persequendi, fol. 13.
15 For a comprehensive discussion of hearsay in the Roman law tradition, see Prospero Farinacci, Tractatus 
de testibus (Venice: Giorgio Varisco, 1609), fols. 233r– 46v, analysed in Damaška, Evaluation of Evidence, 101– 4. A 
critical vernacular French discussion of this issue appears in Guillaume Jaudin, Traité des tesmoings et d’enquestes 
(Paris: Jeanne de Marnef, 1546), fols. 101r– 102v.
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Fig. 1 Jean Milles de Souvigny, Praxis criminis persequendi (Paris, 1541), fol. 3r (Bibliothèque 
municipale Orléans)
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Ultimately, Souvigny suggested that hearsay merited attention whatever its 
limits.
Did practice correspond with theory? And, more specifically, what role did 
the evidence of hearsay play in criminal proceedings from late Renaissance 
France? In order to examine the evidentiary value of hearsay in practice, this 
article analyses a major series of homicide interrogations conducted as part of 
the preparatory or information- gathering stage of criminal proceedings in 
the high court of the Parlement of Paris, which represent some of the length-
iest and most considered evaluations of oral evidence of any criminal archive 
in Renaissance Europe.16 Anybody condemned by a criminal court in France 
to a sentence of corporal punishment or one of equal severity had the right 
for their case to be heard on automatic appeal by a parlement with the cost of 
the appeal paid for by the subaltern court, often funded by the prosecuting 
party acting as plaintiff (partie civile).17 This automatic appeal system ensured 
that the parlements could act as a check on the potentially over- zealous sen-
tences given by their subordinate courts. As a court of appeal, the Parlement 
heard up to 800 cases concerning serious crime each year, drawn from subor-
dinate courts as far as Lyon in the south and La Rochelle in the west. The 
Parlement saw its role primarily as a court of appeal, ‘a sanctuary like the cities 
of refuge to which the children of God withdrew when they were pursued’ in 
the terms of the avocat général Louis Servin during a hearing in the court’s 
audience chamber in 1586.18 The cases considered here show that the 
Parlement also accepted cases from litigants who made use of its justice 
directly when it acted as a court of the first instance or in order to confirm 
pardons issued by a chancery.19 Quantitative analysis demonstrates that hear-
say plays a numerically small role in the sample of cases analysed here.20 What 
matters more than the frequency of appearances of these terms, however, is 
what significance the presiding judge gave to them. The magistrates in the 
Parlement of Paris generally steered their witnesses in interrogations away 
16 The sample of 148 cases analysed in this article represents all those labelled ‘assassination’, ‘homicide’, 
and ‘murder’ in an inventory of the instruction series in the Parlement from the earliest case in 1570 until the 
end of the catalogue in 1623 (Archives nationales (hereafter AN) Inv.4511er, covering AN X2B 1174– 84). The 
analysis particularly focuses on fifty- six cases from that catalogue, selecting those for which it has been possible 
to identify the various stages of the case proceedings through record- linking with other series in the criminal 
archives of the Parlement, notably the registers of incarceration kept in the Archives de la Préfécture de Police 
(hereafter APP) AB 3– 26. On feuding and homicide tried before the Parlement and other jurisdictions in this 
period, see Stuart Carroll, Blood and Violence in Early Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
17 For an overview of the Parlement’s jurisprudence in this period, see Yves- Marie Bercé and Alfred Soman, 
‘Les archives du Parlement dans l’histoire’, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes, 153 (1995), 267– 73; Alfred Soman, 
‘La justice criminelle, vitrine de la monarchie française’, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes, 153 (1995), 291– 304.
18 Bercé and Soman, ‘Les archives du Parlement’, 265.
19 The limited sample of fifty- six record- linked homicide cases in the instructions series introduced in n.16 
consists of twenty- six cases tried by the Parlement in the first instance and thirty cases related to a pardon plea.
20 Among almost 200,000 words of interrogations for the limited sample of fifty- six record- linked homicide 
cases, the crucial term for hearsay – ouy dire – and cognate forms such as ouy parler or ouy par bruict commun ap-
pear in just 172 question and answer pairs.
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from questions of hearsay and onto issues that they could confirm with direct 
eyewitness testimony. And the litigants knew well what kind of evidence might 
contribute to a case and what the court might cast aside. Yet if the legal doc-
trine holds true that two eyewitnesses were necessary for a full proof, was the 
evidentiary arithmetic so elementary, and how far were magistrates, witnesses, 
and the accused willing to deviate from it?
2. ‘that’s just hearsay’
When hearsay evidence did appear during interrogations conducted in the 
criminal chamber of the Parlement of Paris, the court scribe typically marked 
it out as evidence by ‘ouy dire [hearsay]’, or more rarely ‘bruit commun [com-
mon rumour]’ and ‘rumeur [rumour]’, and these terms framed third party 
oral evidence in these witness depositions for homicide, as it did in Souvigny’s 
conceptual discussion.21 Allegations made by common rumour invoked 
knowledge that was widely established as being true and therefore worth in-
vestigating by the court, backed by an assumption that it should not be hard 
to find eyewitnesses to confirm the point.22 Along these lines, most homicide 
investigations included a stock question as to whether the accused had a long-
standing quarrel with the victim.23 Quarrels depended on renown, and gossip 
about them spread easily, an association that Charles d’Aguerre exploited as 
he denied he was engaged in a feud with the deceased sieur de Bazauge, say-
ing that ‘a common rumour that was circulating’ told of their quarrel but 
when he asked his rival ‘whether or not this is true’ he denied it.24 In this way, 
d’Aguerre pre- empted potentially contradictory witness testimony by equat-
ing it with mere gossip. A stock question about the background to a quarrel 
could thereby set the scene for an interrogation but rarely served to gather 
affirmative evidence since it was simple to dismiss.
Moments when hearsay appeared in the course of interrogations can reveal 
the ways in which magistrates attempted to place limits on its evidentiary 
value. Sometimes the magistrates in the Parlement themselves asked witnesses 
about matters of hearsay and so kept control over its presence in the court-
room. The conseiller Gaston de Grieu interrogated a group of royal office- 
holders in 1601 accused of murder, pillage, and rebellion in the village of 
Civry in the Loire valley. Grieu struggled to sift through the various crimes of 
which they had been accused. Interrogating the sergent Jean Huidoc, keen to 
piece conflicting reports together, Grieu asked Huidoc ‘if he knows Michel 
21 Milles de Souvigny, Praxis criminis persequendi, fol. 13.
22 Damaška, Evaulation of Evidence, 103– 4.
23 A guide to conducting interrogations in cases of homicide in this period is provided in Claude Le Brun 
de La Rochette, Le Procès criminel divisé en deux livres (Lyon: Jacques Roussin, 1610), bk. ii, 58.
24 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 08- 19. ‘A dict que cela ne se trouvera point bien recogneust qu’en ce temps on fait 
courir un bruict au pais que le sieur de Bajauges luy debvoir donné des coups de bastons vouloit scavoir d’ou 
venoit le bruict et feit demande aud. sieur de Bazain s’il estoit veritable, lequel dist que non.’
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Gorin, a notary at Civry, and whether he has heard it said that his house was 
robbed in the night?’ Hidoc replied that ‘he knows Gorin and has heard it 
said that Gorin’s house was robbed and that Gorin is married to his [Huidoc’s] 
cousin … He said that Gorin told him that he did not know who did this and 
that Gorin told him to investigate it’.25 In this case, the conseiller Grieu rein-
forced his enquiry into hearsay by naming a particular victim of theft – the 
notary Michel Gorin – while Huidoc’s reply not only reported what Gorin had 
told him but justified the report since Gorin had married his cousin. As the 
jurists recommended, in this case Grieu’s rare but exemplary recourse to a 
question concerning hearsay was justified by the range of crimes he was inves-
tigating and it was circumscribed by enquiring about a particular reported 
conversation.
Hearsay, rumour, and reputation played a particularly important role in the 
confrontation of witnesses. According to the 1539 ordonnance of Villers- 
Cotterêts (articles 153– 7), after the presiding magistrate had taken a first ini-
tial deposition he then confirmed witnesses in their testimony and confronted 
the witnesses with the accused. He then gave the accused a chance to offer 
reproaches and argue that the witness’ testimony should be considered 
invalid, and finally he asked the accused to confirm or deny the witness’ testi-
mony read to them. This procedure was especially lively in the case of Michel 
Josset, a former assistant to a tax official in Mortain, who was accused of killing 
Jehan Doissie, sieur de Tourchet. Josset denounced the witnesses that his 
opposing party set against him as false and suborned, as thieves, fornicators, 
and jealous litigants. For example, Josset told the court that the witness 
Jacques Champs would say what he was told for money, that ‘he had taken part 
in a robbery from Pierre Guillard and tried to settle that case out of court with 
a notary’, that he was a ‘thief in the night’ who ‘boasted’ of another grain 
theft, and that ‘he had killed his first wife’. Champs replied that his wife lived 
at home with him and that he was a good man, and the court did not give 
Josset the chance to back up his claims, which he based on Champs’ renown 
alone.26 During witness confrontations the court served as a privileged space 
for slander. The witnesses could try anything as a reproach, proffering ‘any 
injuries and villainies they like without fear of retribution’, as the jurist and 
magistrate Ayrault lamented.27 Many like Josset fired a barrage of allegations, 
25 AN X2B 1178, 1601- 07- 02, 1601- 07- 09. ‘s’il cognoist Michel Gorin notaire a Civry et s’il a ouy dire que sa 
maison a esté vole de nuict ? A dict qu’il le cognoist et luy a ouy dire que sad. maison avoit esté vole et a espousé 
la cousine de luy respondant. Interrogé qui il accusoit d’avoir volé sad. maison ? A dict qu’il disoit aud. respon-
dant qu’il n’en scait rien et prie led. repsondant de s’en requerir.’
26 AN X2B 1175, 1581- 05- 20. ‘que led. tesmoin a assisté en la vollerie qui a esté faict en la maison de Pierre 
Guillard contrerolle du sieur de Touchet des il a cherché de composer avec luy par le notaire et y en a contraint 
passé’. ‘a dict pour reproches que led. tesmoin est ung meurdrier qui a tué sa premiere femme … est larron et 
volleur de nuyt qui a desrobé aux boisseaulx … qu’il s’est vanté que estant de retour il ny auroit sans farine … 
Par led. tesmoin a esté dit qu’il est homme de bien et que sa femme est en sa maison et n’en a jamais d’autre et 
desnye tous lesd. reproches’.
27 Pierre Ayrault, L’Ordre, formalité et instruction justiciaire (Paris: Michel Sonnius, 1604), 505.
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although not every claim had force behind it unless it could be justified by 
further witnesses. The accused in these confrontations had to play a difficult 
numbers game, knocking out enough witnesses to leave not even two eyewit-
nesses standing. Josset was fortunate: freed but required to spend three 
months available to the Parlement to be recalled in case more evidence was 
forthcoming that proved his guilt.28
Inquisitorial procedures in late Renaissance France included mechanisms 
that might have generated significant amounts of testimony based on hearsay. 
In this sense it is notable that the sample of record- linked cases involves almost 
no references to the procedure known as the monitoire, a summons issued at 
Sunday mass calling for witnesses to come forward with evidence that often 
proved circumstantial and not directly relevant to the case at hand.29 A rare 
mention of this procedure appears when the labourer Augustin Alexandre 
claimed he had ‘not heard the summons that were published’ against Pierre 
Caillet, who was accused of killing Jean de Beaumont nine years earlier. When 
Caillet led Beaumont into a wood outside Reims, they stopped and Caillet 
called the signal to his accomplices hiding with arquebuses.30 Perhaps Caillet’s 
release without charge was in part due to the weak evidence against him that 
depended on hearsay gathered by the monitoires and repeated in the Parlement’s 
criminal chamber by the merchant Auger de Haulmont, ‘who said that he 
knows nothing about the affair apart from what he has heard by the common 
rumour in the region, which is that he [Beaumont] was killed in August that 
year [1577]’.31 Procedures such as the monitoire existed to announce publicly a 
call for evidence, but the association between a monitoire and hearsay appears 
too strong to have led the magistrates in the Parlement to focus on evidence 
gathered in that manner during earlier stages in proceedings.
Uses of the term hearsay mostly came before the court unsolicited in the 
responses of the witnesses. When hearsay did appear it usually came in the 
form of denials. The examples that accompanied the definition of the term 
ouy dire in the 1694 Académie française dictionary attached it to a dismissal: ‘I do 
not know about that, I have only heard it said’ or ‘That is just hearsay’.32 
Claude de Salmon, who allegedly arranged for her lover to kill her husband, 
used hearsay emphatically to reject the accusation that her cousin La Haye 
and her lover La Pointe lent her forty livres to pay her host to buy tools from a 
cobbler that La Haye used to beat her husband to death. Salmon had ‘never 
28 APP AB 7, fol. 22v, 1581- 04- 08.
29 Eric Wenzel, ‘Forcer les témoignages: le délicat recours au monitoire sous l’ancien régime’ in Les Témoins 
devant la justice: une histoire des statuts et des comportements, ed. Benoît Garnot (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de 
Rennes, 2003), 83– 90.
30 AN X2B 1176, 1586- 08- 13. ‘a dict qu’il n’a ouy publier lesd. monitoires et ne scayt si on en faisoyt 
quelque poursuite’.
31 APP AB 9, fol. 230v, 1586- 08- 27; AN X2B 1176, 1586- 08- 13. ‘qu’il n’en peult rien scavoir sinon par le bruit 
commun du pais qu’il fut tué le lendemain de la mois de l’aoust’.
32 Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française dédié au roy, 2 vols (Paris: la veuve de Jean- Baptiste Coignard and 
Jean- Baptiste Coignard, 1694), ii, ‘Ouy dire’.
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heard tell of this accusation and denied it as false’, so false indeed that it was 
not even the subject of gossip.33 After persistently denying the charge of con-
spiring to kill her husband she was sentenced to a short period of imprison-
ment.34 The common formula that Salmon repeated – ‘I have not even heard 
tell of that’ – accounts for the majority of uses of hearsay as a defence strategy, 
part of a vocabulary of denial that proved a safe means to negotiate interroga-
tions in the criminal chamber of the Parlement when the magistrates so rarely 
had recourse to torture, and when they did they only extracted confessions in 
exceptional cases.35 Indeed, by claiming that ‘I have not even heard tell of 
that’, a witness was insisting to the magistrates that the court had no grounds 
for torturing them to obtain further information, since there was not even a 
half proof based on renown that might support the allegation.
Although statistical analysis shows that the Parlement rarely extracted con-
fessions by torture, in the cases when torture did apply it inflicted excruciating 
pain on the accused in ways that changed the dynamic of an interrogation.36 
In the case of torture involving François Simon hearsay appears as a frequent 
denial that the accused used as he pleaded for the pain to stop. Standards of 
evidence drop in this interrogation under torture conducted by the conseillers 
Jérôme Angenoust and Hardouin Fourcher, as Simon gave these magistrates 
the names of people associated with the death of the sieur de Marolles and 
who the court should plausibly be torturing instead of him.
• He was asked if he agreed to kill Marolles and whether he followed 
through with this?
• He said that he heard his father say that the sieur de La Grouillère was 
there. He cannot say whether this is true, but from what people say Le 
Noir and La Grouillère and Le Gascon were there.
• He was wracked and then asked again, who fired the shot?
• He said that he heard that it was La Lande who fired the shot and that La 
Grouillère, Le Gascon, and Le Noir were there but he only knows this by 
hearsay.37
33 AN X2B 1178, 1601- 12- 31. ‘A dict qu’elle n’en a jamais ouy parler et est desnya faulseté et meschament 
inventée.’
34 APP AB 15, fol. 233r, 1602- 05- 31.
35 For a statistical approach to the application of torture in the Parlement of Paris, see Alfred Soman, ‘La 
justice criminelle au XVIe et XVIIe siecles: le Parlement de Paris et les sièges subalternes’ in Soman, Sorcellerie et 
justice criminelle: le Parlement de Paris (16e– 18e siècles) (Aldershot: Variorum, 1992), 38– 49.
36 For a recent synthentic account of the role of torture in inquisitorial proceedings, see Sara Beam, 
‘Violence and Justice in Europe: Punishment, Torture, and Execution’ in Robert Antony, Stuart Carroll, and 
Caroline Dodds Pennock, (eds.), The Cambridge World History of Violence, Volume 3, AD 1500– AD 1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2020), 390– 4.
37 AN X2B 1176, 1582- 05- 03. ‘s’il y avoit pas comploté de tuer Marolles et enquis qui l’a tué apres ? A dict 
qu’il ouyt dire a son pere et a La Lande si le sieur de Grenouillere y estoit. A dict qu’il n’en scayt rien, a dict que 
on disoit que Le Noir le sieur de La Greouillere et Le Gascon y estoient. Luy a esté baillé le treteau et est sous-
tenu. Enquis qui a tiré le coup ? A dict qu’il a ouy dire que c’est La Lande qui a tiré et on dict que La Greouillere 
y estoit et Le Gascon et Le Noir n’en scayt rien que par ouy dire.’
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Simon’s hearsay evidence perhaps seemed more acceptable in the torture 
chamber where such weak claims could not escalate the interrogations into 
further violence since the court had reached the limit of judicial violence avail-
able in its proceedings. And by suggesting names of accomplices he knew only 
by hearsay – such as La Grouillère, who had been arrested alongside him – 
Simon offered the magistrates reason to end the torture proceedings satisfied 
with the information he had given them. La Grouillère in his interrogation 
under torture denied the allegations and insisted Simon wanted to do him 
harm. Simon’s strategy worked in part, as La Grouillère was sentenced to ban-
ishment and to pay reparations to the family of the victim, while Simon and Le 
Noir had their case demoted to a lesser dispute (procès ordinaire as opposed to 
the procès extraordinaire of a full criminal trial) where it might be settled finan-
cially.38 Simon’s hearsay evidence against La Grouillère was supported by the 
eyewitness testimony of his brother Gilles Simon, condemned to death for the 
homicide and executed a few weeks earlier. But this case came from Étampes 
on appeal, so the initial interrogations were sent back along with the prisoners 
following the judgement of the Parlement, and it is impossible to determine 
the strength of the evidence produced against the parties.
A final category of hearsay evidence concerns testimony in which witnesses 
quoted the direct speech of a third party. This sort of evidence falls firmly 
under the modern common law hearsay rule and raises common problems in 
its evaluation, but Renaissance jurists were more circumspect in limiting the 
term hearsay to oral evidence gathered ex auditu.39 As so often in questions of 
practical jurisprudence in this period, no guidance is to be found in the 
French royal ordonnances, which gave clear instructions to structure the cor-
rect procedure for gathering witness evidence but rarely on how to interpret 
it. In order to highlight direct reported speech to the judges, criminal scribes 
often indicated it in their transcriptions by using a slightly larger hand, italics, 
or using a phrase such as ‘and he said in his own words’, serving to highlight 
how much of the rest of the oral evidence gathered is a summary report writ-
ten up in the third person to suit the record- keeping of the court.
The most frequent examples of direct evidence of overheard speech pre-
sented to the Parlement in homicide cases came in witness reports of over-
heard insults that provided a vivid basis for determining whether a killing was 
premeditated.40 Claude Duchêne, sieur de Crays, aged twenty- eight, sought 
pardon for killing his older brother François Duchêne by pleading the death 
was an accident.41 Direct reported speech from their fatal encounter in the 
woods outside Crays formed Claude’s best argument that the killing came in 
38 APP AB 8, fol. 110r, 1582- 01- 22.
39 Mirjan Damaška, ‘Of Hearsay and Its Analogues’, Minnesota Law Review 76 (1992), 436– 9.
40 For many such examples in two recent editions of remission letters, see Guerre civile et pardon royal en Anjou 
(1580– 1600): lettres de pardon entérinées par le présidial d’Angers, ed. Michel Nassiet (Paris: Erudist, 2014) and Les Lettres 
de pardon du voyage de Charles IX (1565– 1566), ed. Michel Nassiet (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 2010).
41 APP AB 7, fol. 96r, 1581- 11- 27; AN X2B 1175, 1581- 11- 29; AN X2B 120, 1582- 07- 20.
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the heat of the moment, because of François’ aggression, and therefore 
should be eligible for pardon. In the interrogation before the Parlement, 
Claude reported how François had asked him for money but Claude calmly 
refused and insisted he had no more to lend, insisting ‘as you wish my brother 
but I do not have any money’.42 François escalated the dispute as he cried ‘By God 
you will give it to me’, before he took out his arquebus and ‘chased Claude, put-
ting him on the back foot’.43 Next François tried to shoot him, but his arque-
bus would not fire. He drew his sword and charged at Claude to try to kill him. 
Claude insisted that his only option was to draw his arquebus in return, but 
this went off accidentally and the shot killed François. In the accompanying 
remission letter, François’ speech appeared more threatening – ‘and by God I 
will have the money, my boy’ – and Claude’s response even calmer ‘responding 
graciously in these words, ‘my brother I owe you nothing and I cannot lend you 
money as I already lent you money on the feast of St. John last’. In this version, 
François again escalated the discussion by ‘swearing and blaspheming as was 
his want, in a fit of anger’, before the fatal attack took place.44
Claude Duchêne’s testimony, both in the interrogation and the remission 
letter it confirmed, addressed the demands of homicide law that permitted 
pardon in the event of an accidental killing committed in the heat of pas-
sion.45 Comparing the two documents, both testimonies were mutually rein-
forcing. The remission letter gave slightly more detail about events and made 
a more elaborate justification of the killing, since the scribe had more time to 
prepare it as a neat, parchment copy compared to the draft ‘minute’ of the 
interrogation. Perhaps he copied the passage in the remission letter from the 
record of a previous interrogation.46 Most significantly, the combined force of 
Duchêne’s testimony in both the interrogation and remission letter lay in the 
direct reported speech that confirmed François had started the argument and 
threatened to kill the defendant Claude with his unbridled tongue. Accurate 
recording of the direct reported speech between the interrogation and the 
remission letter confirmed the outcome of the case, so that Duchêne was 
ordered to pay a fine of ten écus to his parish and another ten écus to the poor 
in lieu of the far heavier death penalty he otherwise might have faced.
42 AN X2B 1175, 1581- 11- 29. ‘comme voules vous mon frere d’argent il n’en ay pas.’ The italics in the transcrip-
tions presented here follow the practice of the manuscript to indicate reported speech.
43 AN X2B 1175, 1581- 11- 29. ‘Mort- Dieu, teste- Dieu tu m’en bailles’, ‘led. respondant se retira et fut poursuivy 
par led. defunct et se meyt led. defunct en rebours’.
44 AN X2B 1175, 1581- 11- 29. ‘et quoy mortdieu je n’auray donc d’argent mon mignon,’ ‘mon frere je ne vous en doibs 
point et quand je vous devay je vous en bailleray, je vous ay avancé le tout de Sainct Jehan fors declarer que je vous ay lors 
que je vous les devay’, ‘jurant et blasphement comme de coustume et en grande collere’.
45 Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 7, 36– 76.
46 Ayrault, L’Ordre, formalité et instruction justiciaire, 525, laments this practice, which Davis, Fiction in the 
Archives, 162 n.55, points out is contrary to formal procedure.
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3. ‘we must kill the house of charlus, even the cats and the dogs’
The cases discussed so far reinforce the general assertion that the magistrates 
of the Parlement as well as the witnesses they interrogated generally avoided 
evidence from hearsay and instead sought to establish facts in the courtroom 
through direct eyewitness evidence. By contrast, the investigations into the 
assassination of Jean de Lévy, conte de Charlus, demonstrate a particularly 
significant range of ways in which witnesses made assertive use of the term 
hearsay in the course of their interrogations. Indeed, to an extent the out-
come of this trial depended on the use and manipulation of hearsay evidence. 
This case is the largest in the sample, involving twenty witnesses.47 Charlus’ 
widow, Diane de Daillon, instigated the case as plaintiff (partie civile), and the 
conseiller in the Parlement Guillaume des Landes led the investigations. The 
accusations focused on Balthazar de Gadagne, sieur de Champroux and his 
kin, who allegedly plotted to kill Charlus as well as his son and his lackey in an 
armed confrontation that took place on Thursday 20 October 1611.48 The 
Gadagne clan claimed to be returning from a hunting trip that day when they 
encountered Charlus and his party, but the confrontation exploded as the 
culmination of years of friction between Champroux and Charlus over land-
holdings and local politics that dated back to the 1590s.49 The skirmish on 20 
October 1611 resulted in the deaths of both Champroux and Charlus. In its 
aftermath the Gadagne clan retreated to the château de Champroux, where 
the archers of the lieutenant criminel of Moulins put them under siege. The 
archers arrested the key suspects and their lackeys, but only after many others 
in the Champroux clan fled the scene after allegedly bribing the magistrates 
with wine. The investigation by the Parlement initially proceeded at Nevers, 
beginning on 8 December 1611, while the suspects remained imprisoned in 
nearby Moulins. In the next stage of the proceedings, the Parlement evoked 
the case on 17 February 1612 and it continued in Paris thereafter.50
The first important instances of hearsay in the testimony gathered in the 
Parlement for Grossouvre’s case appear when the lackeys tried to distance 
themselves from complicity in the crime, and argued instead that their mas-
ters alone plotted and executed the assassination. Estienne Moranbour, lackey 
of Grossouvre’s son Louis de Grivel, sieur de Saint Aubin, said that his master 
‘tended not to discuss serious matters such as this before his servants and he 
47 The key records for this case are AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 08– 1612- 03- 14; AN X2A 974, 1612- 07- 07, 1612- 
07- 09, 1612- 07- 12; AN X2B 269, 1612- 07- 21.
48 Others in the party of the sieur de Champroux escaped justice and were condemned to death in effigy: 
AN X2A 974, 1612- 07- 10; AN X2B 269, 1612- 07- 21.
49 For an analysis of this feud, see Stuart Carroll, ‘Vengeance, Kinship Solidarity and Affinity in Late- 
Medieval and Early Modern France’ in Véronique Gazeau and Jean- Philippe Genet (eds.), Liens personnels, ré-
seaux, solidarité en France et dans les îles Britanniques (XIe– XXe siècles) (Paris; Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2006), 76– 9.
50 AN X2B 269, 1612- 07- 21.
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never heard tell of this affair on his lands’.51 And when the confrontation 
happened ‘he heard the gun shots’ but ‘because he was four or five hundred 
feet away … he did not know who had fired them’.52 Michel Dumars, 
Champroux’s sommelier, was asked ‘whether he had several times heard of his 
master’s rivalry with Charlus’ during his fifteen years of service, but he denied 
this, as did almost all the lackeys, and claimed he stayed at home to serve the 
dame de Champroux rather than join the hunting party.53 Sometimes these 
denials seemed implausible to the presiding magistrate des Landes. Claude 
Roupet, lackey of Champroux’s client the sieur de Navière, claimed he had 
‘not even heard tell’ of Charlus’ death, and when des Landes demanded he 
tell the truth Roupet insisted that ‘he only heard tell of the assassination when 
the archers [of the lieutenant criminel of Moulins] arrived’, when ‘they sur-
rounded the château de Champroux’.54 This was when the archers arrested 
all the lackeys as suspects and brought them to the prison of Moulins. The 
prisoners claimed to learn about the details of the case only once they had 
been locked up. Jean Tiger, lackey of Champroux’s cousin Gaspard de 
Gadagne, sieur de Verdun, protested that, although he may have followed the 
party away from Grossouvre and towards the confrontation with Charlus, he 
did not know the names of the noblemen who surrounded him, and ‘only 
heard them named later from other lackeys in the prisons later’.55 Jacques de 
Briont said he had only heard tell of the rivalry between Champroux and 
Charlus ‘on the low roads to Moulins’, although he had allegedly carried let-
ters for Champroux over the previous months.56 Hearsay came easily to the 
lips of these lackeys and clients as they tried to distance themselves from the 
crimes of their masters. In this instance, inferior social status and a place out-
side informal gossip networks served as a useful way for the lackeys to distance 
themselves from suspicion.
Inquisitorial judges knew, as the jurist and Angers magistrate Pierre Ayrault 
put it, that in these troubled times ‘the dexterity and industry that has always 
been required of a magistrate to successfully examine and investigate a crime’ 
needed to be supplemented with ‘guile and finesse if he wants to wheedle 
something out of a suspected criminal’.57 The magistrate in charge of the 
Grossouvre case, Guillaume des Landes, used all of his ‘guile and finesse’ by 
51 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 12. ‘son maitre n’est pas accoustumé de dire en sa presence aulcune chose et 
n’en ouit parler aussy aux terres.’
52 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 12. ‘A dict qu’apres qu’il fut a quatre ou cinq cens pas plus loing dud. bois et 
petite riviere il ouyt bien tirer des coups de pistoles mais ne scait qui tira lesd. coups.’
53 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 10. ‘s’il a ouy plusieurs fois parler au sieur de Grossouvre du different qui estoit 
entre son maitre et le sieur de Charlus ? A dict que non.’
54 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 12. ‘A dict qu’il n’en ouit jamais parler. Interpellé de dire verité. A dict qu’il n’en 
ouit parler que quand les archers viennent.’
55 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 10. ‘depuis les a ouy nommé pardevant les laquais qui sont aussy prisonniers.’
56 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 08. ‘A dict que n’y a rien ouy dire de cela sinon par les chemins bas qu’il fut mis 
prisonnier a Molins.’
57 Ayrault, L’Ordre, formalité et instruction justiciaire, 485.
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making hearsay part of questioning strategy and his way of reading the exist-
ing interrogations. Des Landes repeatedly asked the witnesses whether they 
recognised a memorable piece of reported speech whose source he con-
cealed, apparently gathered from direct eyewitnesses in a previous interroga-
tion. He asked Champroux’s brother- in- law Grossouvre whether he had heard 
Champroux’s brother Beauregard say that ‘we must kill the house of Charlus, 
even the cats and dogs’, to which Grossouvre replied ‘he had never heard tell 
of this or opened his mouth to say those words’.58 When des Landes asked the 
lackey Jean Tiger if he had heard such a phrase, Beauregard’s exhortation to 
kill the house of Charlus down to ‘the cats and the dogs’ became Grossouvre’s 
order to kill ‘the rooster and the rest’, revealing how earwitness evidence was 
particularly liable to distortion as it passed further along a chain of hearsay.59 
Yet des Landes persisted in asking witnesses whether they had heard a variant 
of this phrase because he suspected that the magistrates who first interrogated 
the witnesses in the prison at Moulins had deliberately omitted it when mak-
ing a neat copy of their initial interrogation. ‘This copy does not correspond 
to another signed copy’, des Landes reproached the scribe to the vice- 
sénéchaussée of Bourbonnais, as he alleged that ‘the archers’ deposition has 
gone missing because it did not correspond with what the others had heard 
said’. Such a disappearance would have exculpated the Champroux clan who 
bribed those magistrates with cheese and wine to let them go free during the 
siege of the château de Champroux.60 Indeed, Beauregard and many of his 
clan did escape and avoided prosecution, leaving their lackeys to face the 
magistrates.
Beauregard’s cousin, Marc Grivel, sieur de Groussouvre, was not so fortu-
nate and was eventually banished from the kingdom along with two of the 
family’s lackeys. In Grossouvre’s final interrogation before the criminal cham-
ber of the Parlement, the case’s rapporteur in Paris, the conseiller in the 
Parlement Prosper Bauyn, sought to confirm the key details of the affair and 
asked Grossouvre himself whether he said his clan should kill the house of 
Charlus, including ‘the chickens and roosters’ – yet another iteration – but 
once again Grossouvre ‘said he never spoke of this’.61 The various forms taken 
by Beauregard’s, or Grossouvre’s, exhortation to kill the house of Charlus 
‘down to the dogs and the cats’, ‘the roosters and the rest’, ‘the chickens and 
the roosters’ shows that the malleability of hearsay made it a particularly 
58 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘Interrogé s’il a ouy dire au chevalier de Beauregard qu’il falloit tous tuer en 
la maison du conte de Charlis jusques au chiens et aux chats ? A dict qu’il n’a jamais ouy parler ny ouvrir la 
bouche de tout cela.’
59 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 10. ‘le coq et tout le reste’.
60 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘lad. coppie n’est semblable a une autre coppie de luy collationnée et signée’. 
‘fut advisé qu’on en perdroit la deposition particuliere dud. archer et autres qui en pourroient deposer par ce 
qu’ils n’estoient pas tenu en d’accord d’avoir ouy dire cela et croit qu’ils s’en trouverent quelque deposition’.
61 AN X2A 974, 1612- 07- 7. ‘si … il dict que il falloit tuer la poulle et les poulets ? A dict qu’il n’en parla 
jamais.’
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useful way to track different interpretations of the same piece of evidence, so 
that des Landes’ sharp reading of the case files allowed him not only to deter-
mine the guilt of Beauregard and Grossouvre but also whether the authorities 
in Moulins were complicit in letting Beauregard get away.
What is perhaps the turning point of the whole series of interrogations con-
cerning Charlus’ assassination revolved around hearsay. The key suspect inter-
rogated in Nevers and Paris, the sieur de Grossouvre, tried to distance himself 
from the allegations just as the lackeys had done. But his task proved harder 
since des Landes confirmed that Grossouvre had hosted the conspirators in 
his château for dinner before the hunting trip, although Grossouvre cor-
rected des Landes that they ‘left the Thursday morning’ rather than staying 
for two nights.62 That dinner preceded, and to an extent concealed, the assas-
sination, since it allowed the party to ride out armed to the hilt with ‘pistols, 
and arquebuses, and large horses’, or what Grossouvre dismissed as ‘a few 
pistols’.63 However, Grossouvre denied the hunting party’s connection to the 
assassination. Like the lackeys, he claimed he had ‘only heard tell’ about the 
previous ‘slight differences’ between Champroux and Charlus, and that these 
differences that had been reconciled after ‘the duc de Nevers made them 
embrace’ in order to settle their peace.64 Crucially, Grossouvre claimed he 
had no involvement in the assassination and ‘had only heard of it from the 
rumour that spread’ and ‘in his house and elsewhere he never heard tell that 
there was a plan to assassinate the conte de Charlus’.65 The marginal annota-
tions to this comment in the manuscript of the interrogations mark out and 
explicitly comment on the hearsay evidence. Perhaps these annotations came 
from the procureur du roi who drew up his conclusions and advised the magis-
trates on how to judge the case, perhaps they were added by des Landes who 
was managing instructing the case in Nevers or Bauyn its rapporteur in Paris, or 
perhaps a later reader still who had access to the archive of the Parlement’s 
criminal chamber. The annotation reads ‘asked and has only heard tell of the 
death of Charlus’, emphasising how, to at least one reader of the evidence, the 
way in which hearsay evidence was central to Grossouvre’s defence strategy 
was sufficiently distinctive as to be worth highlighting.66
Overall, because of the complexity of the case of the assassination of the 
conte de Charlus, with its multiple layers of aristocratic intrigue, and large 
number of lackeys interrogated, hearsay played a significant role in witnesses’ 
62 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘qu’ils partirent seulement le jeudy environ midy’.
63 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘avec pistoles et harquebouzes et de grands chevaux’. ‘des pistoles mais fort 
peu.’
64 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘qu’il a ouy dire qu’il y avoit eu quelque different entre eulx … A dict qu’il a 
sceu par ouy dire que led. sieur duc de Nevers les feit embrasser.’
65 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘qu’il a bien ouy dire que led. sieur de Charlus a esté tué mais n’en scait rien 
que par le bruict … et que jamais il n’a ouy parler en sa maison ny ailleurs qu’on deust assassiner le conte de 
Charlus’.
66 AN X2B 1181, 1611- 12- 13. ‘Denie a oy dire la mort du duc de Charlus’.
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denial strategies. This was a notorious case – who had not heard tell of it? – but 
its very renown gave the witnesses space to deny culpability despite their strong 
ties to the culprits, many of whom were since deceased, like Champroux, or 
escaped, like his brothers. Without these culprits, the sheer number of lackeys 
serving as witnesses only indirectly involved with the case made evidence
from hearsay significant. But what impact did hearsay evidence have on the 
judgement? In the absence of the conclusions of the procureur du roi it is impos-
sible to determine this point for certain. The majority of annotations to the 
interrogations draw attention to established facts about who was involved and 
where, suggesting that hearsay was not of interest to the annotator apart from 
the one instance where he drew attention to Grossouvre’s denial. Yet consid-
ering that des Landes interrogated twenty witnesses in the prisons of Nevers, 
and that only three of the accused received a final judgement in person, it 
seems plausible to suggest that most of the lackeys were successful in using 
hearsay to distance themselves from the assassination at the centre of the alle-
gations, reinforced by their inferior status that placed them at one step 
removed from their masters’ feud, and one table away from the great feast 
that preceded the hunt.67 Beyond the question of ‘the chickens and roosters’, 
hearsay did not come up at all during the final series of interrogations of 
Grossouvre and two lackeys in the Parlement’s criminal chamber, led by des 
Landes’ colleague Prosper Bauyn on 7, 9, and 12 July 1612.68 Following the 
preparatory interrogations, the magistrates had isolated Grossouvre as the 
guilty party on 21 July and he was punished by the confiscation of his property 
and banishment from the kingdom, along with two of his lackeys.69
4. ‘everie trueth is not to be told’
The analysis of the evidence of hearsay presented in this article demonstrates 
how magistrates in the Parlement of Paris evaluated the ambiguous value of 
hearsay in complex ways that reflect the sophisticated, discretionary jurispru-
dence exemplified in Renaissance treatises of Roman law. The cases discussed 
in this article also reveal that witnesses and the accused knew how to engage 
with hearsay critically, how hold their tongue and dismiss gossip when it 
helped their cause by insisting ‘that’s just hearsay’. As another proverb col-
lected by Randle Cotgrave put it, ‘Tout vray n’est pas bon à dire’, or ‘Everie 
trueth is not to be told’.70 The challenge faced by magistrates in discerning 
the truth about crime, and evaluating the often weak, fragmented, or fictional 
evidence presented during interrogations, explains why they gave such critical 
attention to matters of hearsay evidence, even if in itself it could never stand 
67 The arrêt names twenty accused, of whom seventeen were condemned in their absence.
68 AN X2A 974, 1612- 07- 07, 1612- 07- 09, 1612- 07- 12.
69 AN X2B 269, 1612- 07- 21.
70 Cotgrave, Dictionarie, ‘Dire’.
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as a source of proof. Material and written evidence presented in criminal in-
vestigations could be easy to dismiss in an age before modern forensics, and 
so oral evidence constituted the principal source of knowledge available to 
inquisitorial judges, just as it did for witnesses and the accused under 
interrogation.
Ultimately, this analysis of the Roman law of proof applied in the inquisito-
rial courtrooms of late Renaissance France reinforces the growing consensus 
among recent histories of communication concerning the continued primacy 
of oral culture in the new age of print, but it does so from a new position 
rooted in legal culture. In a fallen world of abundant information, where 
truth could be so difficult to discern and rumour ran riot, it still seemed plau-
sible for magistrates to discover the truth about crime based on the word of 
two valid eyewitnesses. Nevertheless, the deponents who cited the evidence 
of hearsay in court did not only do so out of common ignorance. It was also 
possible for witnesses and the accused to conceal the truth through strategic 
uses of hearsay, a law- mindedness that suggests a familiarity with the episte-
mological status of rumour that they might have brought to the marketplace 
and village square too. They made magistrates work hard in order to interpret 
the evidence of hearsay presented in courtroom testimonies. In these ways, 
hearsay represented an important object of legal knowledge precisely because 
witnesses, the accused, and the magistrates proved so adept at manipulating 




This article argues that Renaissance legal culture provided a robust means of evaluating the epistemological status of rumour, informed by 
the Roman law of proof. In order to do so, the article explores the meaning 
of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings from late Renaissance France, 
focusing on a major series of interrogations for homicide in the Parlement 
of Paris. It contributes to legal history by demonstrating how the inquisitorial 
procedures employed by the Parlement’s magistrates exemplified the sophis-
ticated Roman law of witness evidence concerning hearsay. And it contributes 
to social and cultural history by revealing how effectively people throughout 
the social hierarchy understood the significance of hearsay in all its forms, 
so that witnesses, the accused, and the magistrates leading their interroga-
tions knew well how to manipulate hearsay evidence to achieve their ends in 
the courtroom. Ultimately, this approach reinforces the growing consensus 
among recent histories of communication concerning the continued primacy 
of oral culture in the new age of print, but it does so from a new perspective 
that emphasises the fundamental role that oral evidence played in creating 
legal knowledge.
